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Cyril E. Abbott, Harding College, Searoy
When Iwas an undergraduate Ionce had a conversation with a
graduate student who was experimenting on rats. During the course
of our discussion Ipointed out the evidence that had been accumu-
lating that the orientation of Hymenoptera depends upon visual
memory. "Well", said my companion with some scorn, "Ihave always
considered such explanations anthropomorphic". When Iasked him
to supply an explanation of his own, he said, "It Is probably kin-
esthetic . Ithought at the time that, had the young man been
more familiar with wasps and less exclusively concerned with rats,
he might have reached a different conclusion. And besides, his
statement did not, from his standpoint, eliminate what he called
"anthropomorphism'', since even In falling back upon klnesthesls
the explanation would be Incomplete without the postulatlon of
some kind of memory.
The history of biology Is very largely a history of attempts
to eliminate superstltltlon and folklore. Even so good a natural-
ist as Romanes was a romanticist. We are probably In agreement
that romanticism, anecdotallsm, and metaphysical teleology are
out of place In the laboratory. The extreme mechanists cannot be
blamed for taking exception to some of the sentimental trash that
has come out In print concerning biological processes. Efforts to
purge biology of humanistic and even supernatural Impedimenta have
resulted In many casualties on both sides. Some of us can still
remember the "unnatural history" we read In our childhood.
Today we have exchanged those traveler's anecdotes for what
Is called "ecology", and the ecologlsts are so afraid of being
thought unscientific that they have Invented their own barbarous
Jargon which no one can understand. And for the past few years a
battle has been waged In education between the advocates of "nature
study" and the "objectlvlsts". The former claim that, considering
the nature of child psychology, ItIs Impossible to teach elemen-
tary pupils science Impersonally and objectively; the latter that
unless science Is taught objectively ItIs not science.
Itseems to me that the question of objectivity Is relative.
No experimental result, even In chemistry or physics, Is absolute;
and certainly the arguments between students concerning the sig-
nificance of results Indicate that Interpretation Is not.
Nor dare we conclude that, because we can apply physloal and
chemical measurements to biological phenomena, vital processes can
be explained only on the basis of physical and chemical concepts.
Physical concepts are themselves In a state of flux. Twenty-five
years ago all physical phenomena were referred to the concepts of
conservation of matter and of energy; today, Ifelectronic physics
has demonstrated anything, ItIs that we have no absolute defini-
tions for either matter or energy, and that causality Is compre-
hensible only on a statistical basis. Even the "laws" of Boyle
and Arrhenlus are still undergoing modification.
For the so-called "laws" of science are not edicts from the
Creator. They are generalizations from experience - an experience
ever changing but never perfect. Objectivity, even Inphysics
and chemistry Is a goal never quite achieved.
"Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
"Or what's a Heaven for?"
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In writing that, Browning came close to feeling truly the
scientific spirit. Indeed It would be a dull world for all of us
were the universe so ordered that the predictability of all phen-
omena Inall their phases was completely within our grasp. And It
Is Just as well, perhaps, that no science Is ever likely to be a
finished product.
We are so used to generalizations In science, and so familiar
with reliable predictions based upon such generalizations, that
we often overlook the fact that generalizations are merely approx-
imations. Ifwe are not careful this Is likely to lead to over-
simplification of problems. Now oversimplification Is a dangerous
technique Inbiology. The Law of Parsimony Is admlssable only If
and when It does not lead us astray. Indeed the history of biolo-
gy Is littered with the derelicts which ran upon this Charybdls In
an effort to escape the Scylla of confusion. One need only recall
Haekel's "Blogenetlc Law", Loeb's "Forced Movements", and Watson's
interpretation of thought as speech movements; or, to go further
back, spontaneous generation and eplgenesis.
We must also avoid the conviction that we have explained a
process by Inventing a name for It. Ecology Is filled with mean-
ingless jargon. So Is physiology. Who dares attempt giving a
satisfactory explanation of "instinct", "chemotroplsm", or "dif-
ferential sensitiveness"? Physiologists are now Inclined to re-
gard reflexes with suspicion. Is there any real need to substi-
tute the word "chemotroplsm" for "olfactlon" or "photo-sensltiv-
lty" for "vision"? Does not the employment of such peculiar terms
lead to confusion?
The Mechanists, especially Jaques Loeb, introduced such terms
to avoid what they considered metaphysical interpretations of nat-
ural phenomena. But in so doing they committed an error and an
oversight: the error was to suppose that a term applied to the
behavior of a few species of organisms necessarily applies to that
of all others; and the oversight was that no matter how careful
one may be to define a term, others are bound to use it different-
ly. Hence the multiplication of terms often confuses rather than
clarifies the Issue.
Behavior is too elusive to yield Itself to simple generaliza-
tions for a variety of phenomena exhibited by a wide range of or-
ganisms in various circumstances. Does one suppose, for example,
that the behavior of a hungry man entering a restaurant duplicates
that of phagocytes attracted to an area of inflamatlon? Apparent-
ly some do, for as late as 1925, one psychologist referred to the
attraction between the sexes in human beings as "erotropism"
—
on
the assumption, presumably, that the reactions of adult human
beings duplicate the behavior of the kind of germ cells they con-
tain.
To be sure, all living processes are based upon certain com-
mon chemical and physical principles. But to admit this is very
different from insisting that by substituting a fevt chemical equa-
tions, mathematical formulae, and physical constants for the or-
ganism we have adequately described it. We cannot even explain
the simplest physiological process by such Juggling. ItIs not to
be wondered at that not long ago a biochemist prefaced his book on
blood chemistry with the challanglng assertion: "This work is
teleologlcal". Nor did one find In the book any speculative dis-
cussion on the nature of the Deity or the immortality of the soul.
Apparently all the author Intended to imply is that the chemistry
of the blood Is self-regulatory.
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ItIs this self-regulation that distinguishes the living or-
ganism from non-living systems; making It impossible to adequately
describe the former on a basis of chemistry and physics alone. To
refer to man, as Herrick has done, as "The Thinking Machine", Is,
biologically speaking, a contradiction of terms. A machine does
not think
- that is why, by definition, it is a machine. No or-
ganism Is "automatic" in the sense that It exhibits invariable be-
havior. Indeed, Goldstein, in his recent book "The Organism" in-
sists that a living system never reacts except as a whole. Even
Sherrlngton is careful to point out that the scratch reflex of
dogs is not a single reflex, nor does its initiation always depend
upon a single stimulus.
Even the mechanists occasionally admit that one cannot define
an organism by its parts, nor its behavior as a mere system of re-
flexes. Bethe, for example, states that the adjustment of the
simplest organism after injury Is an adjustment of the whole or-
ganism and proportional to the injury. It is true that he at-
tempts to define this mechanistically; although In that he is not
entirely successful.
Not only does every organism differ from every other; varia-
tion in adaptive behavior may be observed even in organs. Recent-
lyIhave been observing the pulsation of immature ovaries in
Lucilia sericata Melg. The rate may vary from one pulsation in
thirty seconds to one per second. Sometimes, when a fly Is opened,
the ovaries pulsate feebly for a few seconds and then stop; yet
often, under what appears to be Identical conditions, they pulsate
for hours, and even do so when kept in vitro in Ringer's Solution.
The same kind of stimulus may, in one case accelerate pulsation;
at another time it may entirely inhibit it. Or it may stop one
ovary and accelerate the motion in the other. Although eserlne
generally accelerates the action, it may inhibit ItIn one or both
organs. Itmay stop the organ In either a contracted or relaxed
position. Similar variations are observed when acetylchollne is
used, either alone or In conjunction with eserlne. Nicotine may
stimulate the ovary to pulsate rapidly for several minutes and
then stop, but quite as often It slows the rate of pulsation, which
then continues several hours. Heat and concentrated salt solu-
tions generally Increase the rate of pulsation, but they may in-
hibit it entirely or in part.
Similar results are obtained In the case of the digestive
system. Seldom, in two consecutive specimens, are corresponding
sections of the gut active. The addition of warm water may Ini-
tiate pulsation In the rectal sack, mid-intestine, or crop - or It
may have no effect whatever.
No doubt the activities of the whole organism are, in general,
adaptive, but this adaptlveness varies qualitatively as well as
quantitatively. A fly recovering from the toxic effects of eser-
lne may recover In a variety of ways: the wings may become activefirst, or the legs; or both may become active at the same moment.
Poisoning, from strychnine sometimes has a symptomology resembling
that of eserlne; or the symptomology may differ markedly In the
two cases. And this Is as true of the frogs as of files.
One of the most difficult of scientific techniques Is to de-
termine whether one is dealing with a result or a conclusion. Itis, strange as Itmay seem, difficult to draw a distinct line be-
tween observation and meditation. All one can do is to apply
cautious logic to the problem. The best interpretations often
come, not by a slavish regard for results, but through a careful
selection of the most significant results. We must be careful, of
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course, not to draw conclusions from Insufficient data. Neither
can we afford to Ignore statistical probability. We cannot, as
one worker Is said to have done, draw conclusions from four cases
In a hundred; that Is Ifall of the cases were carried on under
essentially similar conditions. We can reduce both labor and the
margin of error by making certain that our experiments are as
carefully controlled as conditions will permit.
The most efficient experimentalist Is the one who observes
with an open mind; who, without bias, experiments, not to substan-
tiate a prejudice, but to establish a fact. Ifone must general-
ize, let him generalize as Ifhe were the first and last observer
In existence, uninfluenced by preconceptions. ItIs difficult to
do this, but It Is the only way to avoid the mistake the mechanist
himself makes when he accuses the Medieval Scholastic of doing the
same thing: that of trying to demonstrate only what one wishes to
prove. Deterministic mechanism may be quite as much of a religion
as Calvinism; In spite of their contrary conclusions, both are
based upon the same system of metaphysics. And metaphysics,
though valuable elsewhere, Is out of place In a laboratory. The
advice which Francis Bacon applied to readers, applies equally to
the laboratory experimentation. "Read", he advised, "not to ac-
cept, nor to refute; but to weigh and consider."
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